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Summary findinigs
It seems natural to attribute  to wage rigidity (stemming  I  Labor policies may not be the source of wage
from highly distortionary  labor policies) the over-  misal.gnment and real rigidity. When compared
valuation of the CFA franc after the negative external  internationally, minimum wages in CFA countries are
shocks of the 1980s. Using a variety of data sources,  not high enough to account for the observed wage
Rania assesses the actual rigidity of wages in CFA  misalignment, and their adjustment over time has been
countries and the relationship of wage rigidity to labor  responsive to real shocks.
policies. He shows that:  *Unions  in the private sector seem to have been more
r  Workers' wages are higher in CFA countries than in  more instrumental in creating wage moderation than in
similar countries outside the CFA zone and higher than  creating wage drift in CFA countries. Their members
the earnings of similar self-employed workers within the  usually get lower wages than similar nonunionized
same countries.  workers, probably because of the subordinate nature of
* Real wages are rigid (in the sense of closely  the labor movement in CFA countries.
following fluctuations in government wages and  *  Government pay policies and (possibly) limited
consumer prices) but there is no evidence of nominal  competition in product markets are the most probable
wage rigidity.  causes of wage misalignment and real wage rigidity in
CFA countries.
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In January 1994 the CFA Franc was devalued from 50 to  a  100 per French Franc.  This
devaluation  marked the end of almost half a century of pegged exchange rates between the thirteen
countries  which nowadays  make  the Communaute  Financiere  Africaine  and their former  colonial  power.'
The 50 to 1 parity had been set in October 1948, at a time when CFA stood for Colonies  Franqaises
d'Afrique.  Ever since, the French Treasury has guaranteed  the convertibility  of the CFA Franc.  In
return,  CFA countries  were supposed  to follow strict rules of monetary  discipline. Not surprisingly,  their
inflation  has been significantly  lower than that of other African  countries  (Devarajan  and Rodrik, 1991;
Conway and Greene, 1993). For some time, it seemed that their growth performance  was better too.
C6te d'Ivoire, for instance, used to be considered  an economic  "miracle" in the late 1970s. But this
positive  assessment  was later put in doubt (Assane  and Pourgerami,  1994;  Savvides,  1995).
At the roots of the 1994  devaluation  lies a dramatic  fall of export  prices for cocoa, coffee and oil,
as well as a substantial  appreciation  of the French Franc against the dollar. At first, an effort was made
to cut government  expenditures  and raise tax revenue. But this strategy  failed to achieve  the deflation
that was required to restore competitiveness. A consensus gradually emerged: the problem was the
downward  rigidity of prices,  resulting in turn from the downward  rigidity of formal sector  wages. In the
presence  of a nominal  rigidity, devaluing  the CFA Franc appeared  as the only way out of the recession.
After the devaluation,  there is some concern that labor market rigidity may create future cycles of
The Communaute  Financiere  Africaine is actually made of two zones, based on similar but
separate agreements  with France. The west zone includes  Burkina Faso, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire,
Mali, Senegal  and Togo. The central  zone includes  Cameroon,  Central African Republic,  Chad,
Congo  and Gabon.declining competitiveness, stagnant output, recurrent devaluations and ever-rising  inflation.  If the fixed
exchange rate regime is to be kept, it is key to ensure that wages are flexible.
Labor market policies and institutions are a natural candidate to explain the stubborn currency
over-valuation  observed  in  CFA  countries.  These  countries  replicated  the  kind  of  labor  legislation
adopted by France immediately after World War II, with a vengeance.  There were national minimum
wages, but also detailed  salary grids  setting the minima  for workers  in each sector at  every level of
employment, based on their formal training and seniority.  Layoffs required a government authorization
that was highly political in nature and could take months or even years to be granted, if at all.  In some
countries, hiring was under strict government control too, through large and inefficient placement offices
centralizing  information on vacancies and job seekers.  Finally, trade unions were well implanted in the
formal sector of the economy, partly  due to their  role in the  process that  led to  independence  from
France, but also because of significant barriers to competition in product markets.
The goal of this paper is to evaluate whether and how the labor market policies characterizing
CFA countries contributed to the currency over-valuation observed before the  1994 devaluation.  Note
that the "how" issue is as relevant as the "whether" issue.  Labor market policies and institutions may be
a source of wage rigidity in two substantially different ways.  Formal sector wages may be high due to
legal minima and mandated benefits.  In this case there is a nominal wage rigidity, implying that wages
cannot decline in monetary terms.  The effects on nominal rigidity  on competitiveness  can be  offset
through  devaluation.  But  private  sector wages  can  also  be  high  due  to  trade  union  activities,  to
government pay policies, to incumbent workers taking advantage of large hiring and  firing costs, or to
employers and employees sharing the rents created by imperfectly competitive product markets.  In these
latter cases there is a real wage rigidity, usually involving relatively stable ratios between formal sector
wages on the one hand and government wages and consumer prices on the other hand.  In the medium
run, devaluation can do little to affect these ratios, hence to restore competitiveness.
2Unfortunately, the literature is not of much help regarding the link between labor market policies
and currency over-valuation in developing countries.  Even in studies done by or for the World Bank,
different  views can be found.  For instance, L6pez and Riveros (1990) examined data from four Latin
American countries and concluded that distortions in the formal labor market were a source of real wage
rigidity, implying a low responsiveness of the real exchange rate to devaluation.  But on the other hand,
Horton, Kanbur and Mazumdar (1994) considered a broader set of countries and concluded that inflation
was effective in reducing real wages, thus raising the real exchange rate.  It is probably difficult to find
more opposite views on any economic issue.  Given this ambiguity of the literature, a careful analysis of
labor markets in CFA countries is warranted.
2.  Policies Affecting Wages
a)  Main features
The CFA zone is characterized by  some of the heaviest  labor market regulations  in the world
applied to  some of its tiniest  formal  sectors.  As Table  I  shows, employment  in firms  and agencies
complying with regulations represents at most 5 percent of the labor force.  Furthermore, roughly half of
this employment is in the public sector.  Only a handful of private sector firms is therefore confronted to
minimum wages, hiring and firing constraints and other labor market regulations.  At a first glance, the
small  size  of  formal  sector  employment  suggests  that  labor  market  policies  and  institutions  are
essentially irrelevant in CFA countries.  However, most of the exports from these countries, as well as a
key portion of the inputs used in the rest of their economies, are handled by formal sector firms.  It is
therefore of paramount importance to understand how these firms are affected by labor market policies
and institutions.
3Table 1
The Potential  Coverage  of Regulations
Labor force  Formal sector employment
(thousand  (thousand  persons)
Country  persons)  _
Private  Public
Burkina  Faso  4167.1  35.6  34.2
(1990, 1993, 1991)  [100.0]  [0.9]  [0.8]
Central African R.  1384.5  13.0
(1990)  [100.0]  [0.9]
C6te d'Ivoire  4598.6  131.5  116.0
(1990)  [100.0]  [2.81  [2.5]
Mali  2958.7  40.2
(1990, 1991)  [100.0]  [1.4]
Niger  3619.0  15.8  39.7
(1990, 1991, 1991)  [100.0]  [0.4]  [1.1]
Senegal  2347.6  79.6  66.3
(1988)  [100.0]  [3.4]  [2.8]
Togo  1396.3  22.4  33.7
(1990, 1991, 1991)  [100.0]  [1.6]  [2.4]
Notes: Figures in  parenthesis indicate the years the data refer to,  while figures in  brackets are
percentages  of the labor force.  The fonnal private sector may include state-owned  commercial
firms in some countries. Data on the labor force for all countries,  except Senegal,  are from the
International  Labour Office. Data on private sector employment  in C6te d'Ivoire are from the
Banque  de Donnees  Financieres. In Senegal,  they are from Banque  de Donnees  Economiques  et
Financieres. Other data for Senegal  are from the Ministry  of Finance. For other countries,  data
on formal  sector  employment  are from the Statistiques  Economiques  of BCEAO.
4The purpose  of this  section is to describe the institutional  setting of CFA countries in a way
which is general enough to fit most of them.  Specific examples are given though, particularly in the case
of CMte d'Ivoire  and  Senegal, which  are the two  biggest  economies  in  the CFA  zone.  Among the
countries for which data on the potential coverage of regulations could be assembled, Cote d'Ivoire  and
Senegal are also those with the  largest formal sectors in proportion of their labor force  (see Table  1).
Since the effects of labor market policies and institutions should be larger too, these two countries will
implicitly provide a benchmark when assessing the distortions created by the current institutional setting.
The colonial administration took a dominant role in the establishment of labor policies for what
are nowadays the CFA member countries.  The first measures were introduced as early as 1926.  A Code
du Travail was implemented for all overseas territories in 1952, partly as a result of a strike organized
and led by Guinea's  Sekou Toure with the support of France's communist labor unions.  For most of the
period after independence from France, this code served as the basis for labor market regulation at the
country level.  Government pay policies were partly inherited from the colonial period too.  In 1950, a
statute known as the second Lamine Gueye law equalized pay between African and French employees of
the colonial administration.  As a result, at independence the average wage in the Ivorian civil service
was more than twice that of an industrial worker (Niessen, 1995).
For decades, labor market policies in CFA countries were characterized  by four main features:
extended reliance on minimum wages, detailed salary grids by occupation and experience for all firms in
sectors with collective  bargaining, centralized  hiring mechanisms, and  stringent constraints  on firing.
Other labor market interventions, such as payroll taxes and mandated benefits, do exist in CFA countries,
but they do not seem to be particularly onerous compared to other developing areas.  For instance, in
Cote d'Ivoire workers enrolled with the social security system have to contribute 4 percent of their salary
to the old-age pension program, and an additional 5.5 percent to the family allowances program.  While
5contributions to the social security system represent a tax rather than a delayed payment, at 9.5 percent
the tax rate is not particularly out of line compared to other countries.
Minimum  wages  were  introduced  in  most  CFA  countries  in  the  1960s,  and  have  been
sporadically adjusted upwards ever since.  Two different national minimum wages exist: one for urban
workers  (the SMIG), the other  for agricultural  laborers in  large plantations (the SMAG).  But  urban
workers in sectors with collective  bargaining have their minimum wages set by highly detailed salary
grids  (the Salaires Minimaux Conventionnels).  The lowest level in these grids  is usually equal to the
SMIG, sometimes augmented by a small premium.  Other  levels vary across occupations and increase
with seniority, but the overall structure is relatively stable over time. These grids are negotiated between
trade  unions  and  employers'  associations,  but  have  legal  force  for  all  workers  and  firms  in  the
corresponding sector.
Collective bargaining outcomes obviously depend on the  strength of the labor movement.  In
CFA countries, trade  unions are often numerically  small, with the  possible exception  of Senegal  (see
Bergen, 1997).  And except in the public sector, they tend to be relatively weak.  But the ability of the
labor movement to affect labor market outcomes should not be judged  based on its membership only: the
nature of its links with the government and political parties matters too.  For a long time, private sector
unions were under firm government control in countries like Burkina Faso, Cote  d'Ivoire  and Gabon,
thanlks to the co-optation of union leaders by the ruling party.  Public sector unions, on the other hand,
have a significant impact on government pay policies and are in some cases independent from the ruling
party.
Until quite recently, a third important feature of labor market policies in CFA countries was the
legal monopoly the government had over hiring decisions.  On paper at  least, all vacancies  had to be
reported to central placement offices which also were supposed to register all job searchers and to make
all placements.  Private firms were not allowed to bypass these offices and advertise their vacancies, say
6through the press.  Only a few private sector placement agencies existed, usually operating under cover
as training providers.  Moreover, the government offices tended to be highly inefficient.  For instance,
the Office de la Main-d'Oeuvre de la C6te d'Ivoire  (OMOCI), with  175 employees  in its payroll, only
managed to make an average of 3440 placements per year in 1988-91. In Togo, there were a meager 152
placements per year during the same period, which represents roughly 0.3 percent of total employment in
the formal sector of the economy (Runner, 1992).
Countries in the CFA zone were also characterized by significant firing costs.  At a first glance,
these costs  may not look excessively  high by international  standards.  In C6te  d'Ivoire,  for example,
mandated severance is set at 40 percent of the monthly wage for each of the first five years of service,
and  the percentage  declines  for  subsequent years.  Even  counting the  advance  notice  compensation,
which may amount to three months of salary, total severance pays remains within the standard range for
countries at that level of development.  The problem is a worker "abusively" fired has the right to an
indemnity (dommages et interets) from his or her employer.  And any layoff for economic reasons used
to be considered "abusive" by the tribunals, which set the indemnity at the equivalent of several yearly
salaries.
b)  Recent trends
The labor market policies of CFA countries have experienced significant changes in recent years.
The depth of these  changes varies across individual countries, and is still negligible  in some of them.
But  there  is  a  clear trend  towards  greater  flexibility  in  all  of the  four  areas  discussed  above.  In
Cameroon, the enforcement of labor laws was deliberately weakened after 1982 (Barba Navaretti et al.,
1996).  In  C6te d'Ivoire,  the  emergence  of a  new trade  union confederation  in  1990, reflecting the
general  drive  towards  more  democracy,  introduced  competition  in collective  bargaining.  Also, the
7suppression of the government monopoly over hiring decisions, in 1991, allowed private sector firms in
the formal sector to recruit by themselves or, more precisely, to do it openly.  In Senegal, the possibility
of renewing temporary contracts over many years, introduced in 1987 and extended in 1989, implicitly
eliminated  firing  costs  for  newly  hired  workers.  In  all  three  countries,  a  gradual  recognition  that
economic layoffs should not be treated in the same way as "abusive" ones has significantly reduced the
cost of restructuring.
Problems  remain  in  several areas  though.  Competition  between  the  incumbent  trade  union
confederation and newcomers brought in a wave of wildcat strikes to Cote d'lvoire,  rather than a drive
towards wage moderation.  The government offices which were in charge of placements were given new
mandates of dubious utility, imposing an unnecessary burden on private sector firms.  In Cote d'lvoire,
the  OMOCI (re-baptized AGEPE) wants to  keep track  of recruitment  by  individual  private  firms to
"observe"  labor market  developments.  Something similar happens  in Senegal, where copies of labor
contracts pile up in a room until it is full, and then are burned to allow the process to commence again.
The  AGEPE  is  also  running  a  series  of  European-type  programs  targeted  at  the  reduction  of
unemployment, while it is unclear whether CMte  d'Ivoire  really faces an open unemployment problem.
c)  Enforcement
Finally,  it is important to distinguish between regulation and practice.  Labor market policies
which look distortive on paper may not be very harmful if standards are set at relatively low levels, or if
the administrative capability to enforce them is weak (see Squire and  Suthiwart-Narueput, 1997).  The
small number of placements made by the central government offices  in charge of hiring indicates that
most of the recruitment was actually handled by the private sector.  In the same vein, it is worth noting
that most  of the  time  and effort  of labor  inspectors is devoted  to solving  individual  labor conflicts.
8Consequently, very few plants are visited to check that they  do comply  with labor standards.  In the
unlikely event of one such visit, some employers add, inspectors can be easily bribed to avoid paying a
fine.
Not  surprisingly, employers do not feel unduly unconstrained by current labor regulations.  A
survey of some 200 manufacturing firms conducted in Cameroon in 1994 reports that only 2 percent of
the interviewees considered labor regulations were a  large or severe problem, compared to 85 percent
who  considered  the  problem  was  slight  or  non  existent.  The  responses  were  3  and  75  percent
respectively for wage costs, 4 and 85 percent for rules regarding layoffs, and 5 and 63 percent for the
cost of layoffs.  Differences in these responses  across plant  sizes and  sectors of activity are relatively
minor, except for the cost of layoffs.  More generally, labor issues appear as the less acute problem faced
by firms, after taxes, corruption, price controls, government rules and difficulties in obtaining licenses, in
order of decreasing importance (Gauthier, 1995).
This  sanguine assessment  of the  labor market  policies in force  could be due  to the  fact that
reforms were  deeper  in  Cameroon  than  elsewhere  in the  CFA region.  However,  a  similar  picture
emerges from studies done for other countries.  In Senegal, before any deregulation of the labor market
had actually  taken place,  most managers viewed  labor market regulations  more  as a  nuisance than  a
constraint  (Terrell  and  Svejnar,  1989).  In C6te  d'Ivoire,  the  most  stringent  labor  regulations  were
reportedly  by-passed  by  firms  using  alternatives  such as sub-contracting  and  apprenticeship  (World
Bank, 1993).
The fact that labor market regulations are not among the main concerns of employers does not
imply that these regulations are irrelevant though.  The Cameroon  survey asks managers whether they
would hire more workers  if selected labor market regulations were removed.  Some 6.5 percent of the
interviewees declared they would if minimum wages were abolished, while 93.5 say they would not.  In
the case of firing restrictions, the answers were 5.5 and 75.5 respectively (Gauthier, 1995). The potential
9employment impact of further deregulation is thus not negligible, although it appears to be modest
compared to other, non-CFA African countries (particularly,  Kenya and Zimbabwe).  Unfortunately,
these surveys only allow to identify the microeconomic  distortions created by labor market policies.
They  do not allow  to assess whether  these policies.  are a source  of wage misalignment.
3.  The Extent of Wage Misalignment
a)  Compared  to wages in other countries
One way to assess  the extent  of wage misalignment  is to compare  average  wages  in the CFA zone
to those in other  countries  with a similar  development  level. Controlling  for the development  level  is key in
this respect. Indeed,  wages  can be expected  to be high, relative  to the average  productivity  of labor,  in poor
countries. The salaried  relationship  is characteristic  of the formal  sector  of the economy,  and this sector is
small in poor countries. Labor  productivity  and eamings  tend to be much  lower in agriculture,  and for the
urban self-employed.  As a result,  wage earners  appear as genuinely  privileged  compared  to the average
worker.  The issue is whether wage earners in CFA countries  are more privileged  than those in other
developing  countries.
This issue can be addressed  by regressing  the ratio of wages  to labor  productivity  on an indicator
of the development  level, and then analyzing  whether  CFA countries  exhibit some systematic  deviation
with respect  to the estimated  regression  line. This is done in Table  2, using  data from a cross-country  data
base of labor  market  indicators  currently  under  construction  at the Research  Department  of the World  Bank.
This  data base includes  information  on annual  wages  in current  dollars  for more  than  one hundred  countries,
including  six from the CFA zone. Most of the figures are from plant-level  surveys  collected  by UNIDO.
The data are from period  1985-93,  but in many  countries  there  are only  a few observations  over this period.
10For the regression analysis wages are divided by contemporary output per capita in current dollars, the latter
variable being an indicator of the average productivity of labor.
Two key explanatory variables  in this  regression are output per  capita measured in dollars of
comparable purchasing power (PPP) and its square. The quadratic term allows for a non-linear relationship
between  the  explained variable  and  economic  development.  Other  potentially relevant  explanatory
variables are the share of urban population and the mean  years of schooling of the  adult  population.
Although these two variables are correlated with the level of development, they have proven significant
when  explaining wage variation across countries (see  Freeman,  1994).  Based  on  the  "new" growth
literature, the possibility that regional factors also play a role is considered in the case of Latin American
and to Sub-Saharan African countries (see Barro, 1991).
11Table 2
Average Wages Across Countries
Dependent variable:
Average wage in 1985-93, in percent of per capita GDP
Explanatory variables
(A)  (B)  (C)  (D)
CFA countries  606.7*  578.7**  586.8**  565.9**
(dummy variable)  (8.026)  (7.375)  (7.247)  (6.757)
Per capita GDP in 1993,  -54.53 **  -50.34 **  -49.70 **  -43.48 *
in thousand PPP dollars  (-4.477)  (-3.078)  (-3.692)  (-2.546)
Per capita GDP squared,  2.096 **  2.086 **  1.985 **  1.917 *
in million PPP dollars  (3.295)  (2.859)  (2.924)  (2.551)
Urban population,  0.403  0.145
in percent of the total  (0.348)  (0.119)
Mean years of schooling  -12.72  -13.06
for ages 25 and above  (-1.365)  (-1.334)
Countries in Latin America and  56.82  62.96
the Caribbean (dummy variable)  (1.260)  (1.295)
Sub-Saharan African  63.41  55.79
countries (dummy variable)  (1.141)  (0.934)
Independent term  435.0**  458.2**  385.3 **  416.7 **
(11.262)  (9.413)  (7.180)  (6.267)
Number of observations  108  106  108  106
Adjusted R2 0.566  0.568  0.566  0.568
F test  47.46  28.58  28.91  20.70
Note: Values in parentheses are "t" statistics.  Significant coefficients at the 5 and 1 percent level
are indicated by one and two asterisks respectively.
12The  econometric  results  reported  in Table 2 show  a convex  relationship  between  the ratio of wages
to labor  productivity  on the one hand and the level of development  on the other  hand. This relationship  is
downward-sloping  at low levels of development. It reaches  a minimum  for industrial  countries,  where
predicted  wages  are comparable  to per capita  output. At the level of development  of CFA  countries,  wages
are equal  to about  six times  per capita  output. Also,  the ratio of wages  to labor  productivity  appears  to be
larger,  other  things equal,  in countries  with a higher  urban population  share and a lower  level of schooling.
But the corresponding  coefficients  are not statistically  significant. Similarly,  wages appear  to be higher  in
Latin American  and Sub-Saharan  African  countries  than in other areas, but the associated  coefficients  are
not significant  either.
From the point of view of this study, the most striking  result in Table 2 concerns  the dummy
variable for countries in the CFA region.  Whatever  the specification  chosen for the regression,  the
coefficient  multiplying  this dummy  variable  is positive  and statistically  significant.  Its order of magnitude
remains unaffected,  at around 600 percent, regardless  of the set of control variables included in the
regression. Given  that the predicted  level of the ratio of wages  to labor productivity  for these countries  is
also in the order of 600  percent,  the results in Table  2 imply  that wages in CFA countries  are about  twice  as
high as in other  countries  with a similar level  of development.  This finding,  illustrated  in Figure 1, can be
considered  as clear  evidence  of wage  misalignment.
b)  Compared  to non-wage  labor  earnings
A different  way  to assess  whether  wages  are particularly  high in CFA countries  is to compare  them
to non-wage  labor  earnings. This kind of comparison  requires  information  on individual  earnings,  as well
as on individual  characteristics  such as education,  work experience  and other measures  of human capital.
13Figure  1
Average  Wages  and  Economic  Development
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14These control variables are needed to make sure that comparisons are made across similar workers.  The
standard practice in this respect is to estimate Mincerian equations, where the explained variable is the log
of labor earnings and the explanatory variables are individual characteristics like those listed above.  The
analysis is completed by splitting the sample between the individuals who do work in the formal sector, and
are therefore covered by labor market policies and institutions, and those who do not. 2
The criteria used to identify the formnal  sector vary across studies.  In some cases, the sample is
split according to the size of the establishments these individuals work in.  But more elaborate criteria are
applied too.  Consider, for instance,  the study on C6te d'Ivoire by Vijverberg and van der Gaag (1990). This
study applies factor analysis, involving 15 job attributes, to data from the  1985 Living Standards Survey
(CILSS).  The first component of these data is then used as an indicator of the formality of jobs.  This
component turns out to be highly correlated with six of the job attributes.  It is higher when the wage is
subject to minimum wage legislation, when there  is a  signed contract, when the  worker receives paid
holidays, when he or she is eligible for paid sick leave, when there is a retirement plan, and when the
worker receives social security benefits.
A different approach is adopted by Miller and Vall&e  (1995) in the case of Cameroon.  Using a
plant-level  based  survey of  workers  produced by  the  Regional Program  on  Enterprise Development
(RPED), these authors consider three sectors: formal regulated, formal unregulated and informal.  Firms in
the formal regulated sector are characterized by multiple ownership, or by some form of public ownership,
or by having complained about being constrained by labor regulations.  At the other end, firms in the
informal sector are characterized by individual ownership, and by either having apprentices or carrying no
2  Some of the studies also correct for the self-selection of workers into the different sectors.  They
take  advantage  of the  fact  that  workers  in  the  formal  and  informal  sectors  have  different
observable characteristics to make inferences about other, unobservable characteristics that may
affect  their  earnings.  Ignoring  these  other,  unobservable  characteristics  could  bias  the
coefficients associated to the observable ones.
15formal accounts.  All other firms are classified as being formal but unregulated.  This criterion is thus
different from the one used by Vijverberg and van der Gaag.  But the divide between formal and informal
would likely be similar if both were applied to the same sample.
Results from a series of studies done along these lines for selected CFA countries are summarized
in Table 3.  Although the list of studies is almost certainly incomplete, it probably covers a  significant
portion of the literature on this issue.  It could be objected that some of the samples are too small to make
any reliable inference.  The paucity of empirical analysis in this particular region of the world, however,
makes the results from these studies interesting on their own.  Table 3 reports the impact of formality on
labor earnings, based on the coefficient multiplying the formal sector dummy variable in the corresponding
Mincerian equation.  The figures in the Table  indicate the percent change in earnings an individual with
"average" characteristics would experience if he or she shifted from an informal to a formal sector job.
The results in Table 3 provide further evidence of wage misalignment in CFA countries.
With the possible exception of Mali, the gap between formal and informal sector earnings is high by any
standards. Of course, the gap can be expected to be positive even in countries with relatively flexible labor
markets. Formal sector firms may voluntarily pay higher wages as a way to attract better workers, to reduce
the turnover rate, to boost morale or to elicit higher effort levels. Informal sector firms, by contrast, are less
likely to use "efficiency"  wages of this sort. However, the gap between formal and informal sector earnings
seldom exceeds 30 percent, even in countries where the distortions created by labor market policies are
agreed to be large (see for instance MacIsaac and Rama, 1997, on Ecuador). In CFA countries, by contrast,
earnings gaps of 60 percent or more are not uncommon.
16Table 3
Wage Premium for Formal Sector Jobs
Estimation  Burkina  C6te
Study  technique  Faso  Cameroon  d'Ivoire  Mali
Berthelemy and  OLS
Bourguignon  with dummy  203.7  %
variable
(1992; Table  for formal  [CILSS, 1985;
4.4, page 98)  sector jobs  N  = 311]
OLS
Lachaud  with dummies  57.1 %  60.3 %  40.9  %  9.6 %
for covered
(1993b; Table D,  and uncovered  [IIES, 1990-91; N  [IIES, 1990-  [RIES,  1986-  [IIES, 1991;
page 54)  wage jobs  =  219]  91; N =  278]  87; N  = 244]  N  =  202]
Miller and  OLS
Vallee  with sample  70.2 %
split between
(1995; Table  formal and in-  [RPED, 1994;
6.11, page 176)  formal firms  N  517]
(Continued)
17Table 3 (Contd.)
Wage Premium for Formal Sector Jobs
Estimation  Burkina  C6te
Study  technique  Faso  Cameroon  d'Ivoire  Mali
Vallee  and  OLS
Thomas  with sample  34.3 %
split  between
(1994;  Table  regulated  and non-  [RPED,  1993;
5.12, page 170)  regulated  firms  N = 740]
Vijverberg  and  OLS
Van der Gaag  with factor  65.2 %
analysis
(1993b;  Table  for job  [CILSS,  1985;
6.2, page 34)  coverage  N = 295]
Note:  All studies  control  for individual  characteristics,  but the set of controls  varies  across studies. The wage premium  is based on the coefficient
(c) multiplying  the formal  sector  dummy  variable. In the case of Lachaud  (1993b),  it is based on the difference  between  coefficients  for
covered  and uncovered  wage  jobs.  In the case  Vijverberg  and Van der Gaag (1990),  the formal  sector dummy  is the first of the principal
components  of a set of job characteristics.  For large values  of the c coefficients,  in absolute  terms, the percent premia is approximated  as
100[exp(c)-1].  Data sources  and sample  sizes are reported  in brackets. CILSS  is the Cote d'Ivoire Living  Standards  Survey,  a household
survey with national  coverage. IIES is a series of labor force surveys  carried out by the Institut  International  d'Etudes Sociales  in the
capital  cities. RPED is the Regional  Program for Enterprise  Development,  a plant-level  survey  which includes  data on up to ten workers
in each firm.
18These econometric results are consistent with anecdotal evidence that formal sector jobs  carry
"rents" attached to them, and that these rents underlie some commonly observed private deals.  According
to several sources, when central placement offices still existed, job seekers used to bribe their staff in order
to get access to the vacancies in the system.  Now that centralized hiring has been abolished, trade union
representatives claim the bribes go to the foremen who are in charge of recruitment at the floor level.
Paying bribes of this sort would make no sense if the labor market was competitive.  The fact that someone
else than the workers themselves (e.g. the foremen) may appropriate part of the rents does not alter the
conclusion that these rents do exist.
4.  The Nature of Wage Rigidity
a)  Real rigidity
Limited knowledge on how private sector wages are determined explains the uncertainty about the
potential effects of the  1994 devaluation of the CFA Franc.  Numerical exercises based on computable
general equilibrium models tended to conclude that the short-run effects of the devaluation on output were
positive for any plausible values of the key elasticities of demand and supply for goods and services, as well
as for any plausible assumptions on  public expenditures.  The degree of wage indexation, by  contrast,
turned out to be crucial, and could lead to negative long-run effects (Bourguignon et al., 1995).  A better
understanding of how private sector wages are linked to other nominal variables in the economy, including
consumer prices, minimum wages and government wages, is therefore needed.
The link between wages and prices is evaluated in this section using industry-level data for CMte
d'lvoire and Senegal over a period of two decades. Data are from the records of formal sector firms kept by
the governments of these two countries. These records, known as the Banques de Donnees Financieres, or
19BDFs  for short,  include  information  on the total wage bill and employment,  organized  according  to various
break-downs. Although  all firms in the two countries  should in principle  submit  this information  to the
corresponding  BDFs, in practice only formal sector firms do so, and not for all years.  The result is an
unbalanced  panel of some two thousand firms in CMte  d'Ivoire, and of roughly one thousand firms in
Senegal. This section  focuses  on the determinants  of average  labor  costs  by industry  in these panels. There
are 53 such  industries  in the BDF of CMte  d'Ivoire,  and 35 in that of Senegal.
A simple  specification  is used to assess  the link  wages and other nominal  variables. The chosen
dependent  variable  is the annual  change  in the average  labor  cost by sector,  while  the explanatory  variables
are the annual  inflation  rate,  the annual  change in economic  activity  and the annual  change  in the terms-of-
trade level. The explanatory  variables  are defined  at the economy-wide  level;  the latter  two are lagged  one
year.3 To better identify  the sources  of wage rigidity,  the inflation  rate is measured  in three different  ways.
In addition  to the change  in aggregate  consumer  prices,  the change  in the minimum  wage (SMIG)  and the
variation  in the  average  government  wage  are also included  among  the explanatory  variables.
The results, reported in Tables 4 and 5, show that average labor costs follow closely the
fluctuations  of average  government  wages  and also, to some extent,  those of consumer  prices. They  do not
appear  to be affected,  however,  by changes  in the minimum  wage. The coefficient  on the latter  variable  is
not statistically  significant  in any of the  regressions  for C6te  d'Ivoire. In the case  of Senegal,  it is significant
only when  the change  in the average  government  wage is omitted  from  the regression,  which  means  that the
3  These  variables can be considered  exogenous,  because  each of the sectors is too small to affect
macroeconomic  aggregates  on its own.
20Table 4
Determinants  of Wage  Increases  in CMte  d'Ivoire
Dependent  variable:
Change  in the log of average  labor  costs  per worker  in formal  sector firms
Explanatory  variables  (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  (F)  (G)
Change in the log of  0.7235 **  0.7221 **  - 0.0921  - 0.0862
consumer prices  (5.338)  (5.321)  (  0.393)  (- 0.367)
Change  in the log of  -0.0623  -0.0378  0.2713  0.2653
minimum  wages  (-0.480)  (-0.296)  (0.654)  (0.6392)
Change in the log of  0.4748 **  0.5166  **  0.4737 **  0.5128 **
average  government  wages  (4.397)  (3.405)  (4.385)  (3.376)
Change  in the log of  0.0388  -0.0207  0.0178  0.0346  0.0209  0.0481  0.0504
terms of trade (lagged)  (0.760)  (-0.392)  (0.207)  (0.653)  (0.243)  (0.494)  (0.516)
Change  in the log of  0.0718  0.6618 **  -0.2826  0.1064  -0.3075  -0.4325  -0.4525
real output  (lagged)  (0.381)  (3.334)  (-0.816)  (0.480)  (-0.873)  (-1.041)  (-1.079)
Independent  0.0143  0.0674 **  0.0485 **  0.0100  0.0511 **  0.0441 **  0.0488 **
term  (1.149)  (7.903)  (5.844)  (0.842)  (3.306)  (4.768)  (3.074)
Adjusted  R 2 0.045  0.017  0.025  0.044  0.024  0.024  0.023
F test  16.12  6.51  7.15  12.10  5.39  5.46  4.39
Number  of  969  969  724  969  724  724  724
observations
Note:  Data  on average  labor  costs  per worker  are from the Banque  de Donnees  Financieres,  which  is composed  of about two  thousand  medium  and large firms.
There is one observation  per industry  per year, over period 1976-1994. Values  in parentheses  are "t" statistics. Significant  coefficients  at the 5 and 1
percent  level  are indicated  by one and  two asterisks  respectively.
21Table 5
Determinants of Wage Increases in Senegal
Dependent variable:
Change in the log of average labor costs per worker in formal sector firms
Explanatory  variables  (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  (F)  (G)
Change  in the  log of  0.9149 **  0.6586  **  0.6007  **  0.5760  **
consumer  prices  (4.070)  (2.313)  (2.234)  (2.087)
Change  in the log of  0.5938**  0.3014  0.6541  0.1497
minimum  wages  (3.647)  (1.465)  (0.886)  (0.404)
Change  in the log of  0.7219  **  0.6149  **  0.4737 **  0.5877  **
average  government  wages  (3.288)  (2.746)  (4.385)  (2.512)
Change  in the terms  0.8658  **  0.3077  0.8483  **  0.5640  1.0715  **  0.8264 **  1.0522  **
of trade (lagged)  (2.540)  (0.8025)  (2.077)  (1.417)  (2.558)  (2.019)  (2.493)
Change  in output  at  1.3480  **  0.2334  0.0690  0.8140  0.6825  -0.0152  0.6180
constant  prices  (lagged)  (2.437)  (0.380)  (0.106)  (1.230)  (0.969)  (-0.023)  (0.855)
Independent  -0.0186  0.0390  0.0217  -0.0048  0.0511**  0.0142  -0.0250**
term  (-0.629)  (1.591)  (0.806)  (-0.156)  (3.306)  (0.502)  (-0.740)
Adjusted  R2 0.030  0.026  0.019  0.032  0.027  0.019  0.025
F test  8.17  7.07  4.42  6.68  4.59  3.51  3.70
Number  of  686  686  518  686  518  518  518
observations
Note:  Data on average labor costs per  worker are from the Banque de Donnees Economiques et Financieres, which is composed of
about one thousand medium and large firms.  There is one observation per industry per year, over period 1975-1994.  Values in
parentheses are  "t"  statistics.  Significant coefficients at  the 5 and  1 percent  level are  indicated by  one  and  two  asterisks
respectively.
22result is  not robust.  The evidence concerning the  link statistically insignificant when  the  change  in
government wages is considered as an explanatory variable. 4
The prominent role played by average government wages may be due to the presence of several
state-owned enterprises in the BDF samples.  Wage decisions in these firms could indeed be responsive to
govemment pay policies.  To assess the extent to which the labor costs of private sector firms are affected
by  government  wages  it  would  be  necessary  to  have  information  on  state  ownership  by  sectors.
Unfortunately, information of this sort is not available at this stage.  The conclusion that changes in the
SMIG do not have a significant impact on labor costs, on the other hand, should not be affected by the
inclusion of data on state ownership by sectors. 5
The results  in Tables  4  and  5  also  suggest that  labor costs  in  large  firms are  only weakly
responsive to real shocks, as captured by the economy-wide fluctuations in output and the terms of trade.
The coefficients associated to these two variables are not statistically significant in the case of CMte  d'Ivoire.
And only the changes in the terms-of-trade level appear to be relevant in the case of Senegal (the coefficient
multiplying the change in economic activity is not robust to changes in the set of control variables).  Real
shocks could still affect average labor costs through the SMIG, because the latter is endogenous, as will be
shown below.  But the SMIG was found to have little or no influence on pay decisions by large firms.  Real
rigidity thus appears to be an important feature of average labor costs in the formal sector of the economy.
4  Microeconomic evidence on how labor costs reacted to the 1994 devaluation of the CFA Franc is
ambiguous in this respect too.  Using plant-level data for Cameroon, Barba Navaretti et al. (1996)
show that the median wage fell by  11 percent compared to output prices between  1992-93 and
1994-95. But on the other hand the average wage increased by about 13 percent.
5  Given the insignificance of changes in the SMIG over the whole sample, these changes could be
positively correlated with changes  in the labor costs  of private firms only if they were at the
same  time  negatively  correlated  with  changes  in the  labor  costs  of  state-owned enterprises,
which is unlikely.
23This conclusion does not apply to labor earnings in the informal sector though.  If data from a
representative household survey are used, instead of data from a sample of formal sector firms, a negative
association between labor earnings and local  unemployment rates  can be  found.  This was shown by
Hoddinott (1996) using urban data from the 1985, 1986 and 1987 rounds of the CILSS.  Their results also
indicate that the negative influence of unemployment on  labor earnings is stronger in the case .of young
workers, and weaker in the case of public sector employees.  Overall, and after controlling for a number of
potentially serious econometric problems, most notably unobserved location-specific effects, Hoddinott
estimates the wage-unemployment elasticity of Cote d'Ivoire at -0.13.  This is similar to the -0.1 elasticity
reported by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) for the US, Britain and other industrial countries.
b)  Nominal rigidity
The case to devalue the CFA Franc rested in part on the premise that formal sector wages were
rigid downwards.  The conventional wisdom is that the adverse shocks of the late 1970s led to a drop of
aggregate demand, hence creating a substantial deflationary pressure.  While the labor earnings of those
who were not protected by the regulations in force declined, the story goes, workers in the formal sector
succeeded in preventing their wages to be cut.  Labor costs in formal sector firms thus failed to match the
decline in aggregate demand, and this  misalignment was at the roots of a  deep recession.  While this
interpretation of the economic developments of the  1980s and  early  1990s is plausible, there  is little
empirical evidence to support it.
If the conventional wisdom was right, over the  1980s and early  1990s there should have been a
decline of labor earnings in the  informal sector and a  relative stability of wages in the formal sector.
Moreover, if the downward rigidity resulted, as it is claimed, from labor market policies and institutions,
trends in formal sector wages should have reproduced those of the SMIG.  This is because the SMIG not
24only represents the wage of those who make the bare legal minimum: it also provides the "floor" for the
salary grids negotiated between trade unions and employers.  However, none of these two predictions holds
true in the cases of C6te d'Ivoire and Senegal, which are the two biggest economies in the region and also,
arguably, the ones with the most distorted labor markets.
The conventional wisdom  is rejected based on  data from the consumer price  indexes of Cote
d'Ivoire and Senegal. While the BDFs of these two countries provide information on average labor costs in
their formal sectors, there is indeed no similar, readily-available source for labor earnings in the informal
sector.  But the consumption bundles used to calculate consumer price indexes include a few personal
services whose production involves little more than labor. To the extent that these services are provided by
individuals or micro-enterprises, they are not likely to be directly affected by  labor market regulations.
Fluctuations in their prices can therefore be expected to follow closely those of labor earnings in the
informal sector.
To minimize the possibility of a  measurement bias, the focus of the empirical analysis  is on
services whose prices are defined based on output units, rather than on the corresponding labor inputs.
When labor units are used, there is a risk that the statistical offices report the SMIG or some specific
minimum wage set in collective agreements, rather than the actual labor cost, as the relevant information
source.  This is what happens in practice with the prices of domestic service and cooking in the consumer
price index of Cote d'Ivoire.  Moreover, even if the statistical offices did gather the data from the actual
providers of  these  services, the  latter could  declare  fake  wages to  hide  non-compliance  with  labor
regulations.  But there should be no such biases when the unit of measurement is the price of a hair-cut, or
the cost of a laundry for a double-bed sheet.  To the extent that no legal minimum price exists for these
services, there are no  incentives to report fake prices either.  These prices are taken from the European
consumer price index, which goes farther back in time than the African one.
25The resulting indexes for labor earnings in the informal sectors of Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal show
there was no deflationary trend over the 1980s and early 1990s. These indexes are represented in Figures 2
and 3 respectively.6 In C6te d'Ivoire, labor earnings in the informal sector increased roughly at the same
pace as labor costs in the formal sector, at least until the end of the 1980s.  In Senegal, they increased at a
much faster pace.  Figures 2 and 3 also show that both labor earnings in the informal sector and labor costs
in the formal sector increased far more than the SMIG.
The plots in Figures 2 and 3 do not imply that formal sector wages are flexible downwards though.
They only suggest that downward rigidity, if it does exist, did not play a role in the series of events leading
to the  1994 devaluation of the CFA Franc.  In particular, they  reject the hypothesis that  labor market
policies and  institutions were the  obstacle preventing wages  in the formal  sector to  adjust to  a  more
unfavorable international context.  But the downward rigidity of wages, if there  is such a thing in CFA
countries, could still represent a serious problem when facing truly deflationary pressures.  The fact that
these pressures did not materialize in the 1980s and early 1990s does not rule them out for the future.
There is, however, some evidence that formal sector wages are flexible downwards, at  least in
M6te  d'Ivoire.  The reason why this flexibility may not be apparent is because analyses based on averages
tend to neglect composition effects.  In a study using data collected at the plant level, Levy and Newman
6  The represented series are unweighted averages of the indexes for hair-cuts and laundries. Each of
these two, in turn, is an unweighted average of the indexes for all  of the items available in the
European consumption bundle of the two countries. In Cote d'Ivoire, the price index for hair cuts is
based on items 41011 and 41012, whereas the price index for laundries is based on items 31018,
31019 and 31020.  In Senegal, items  118 and  119 were used for  hair-cuts, and  item  148 for
laundries.
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28(1989) showed that average wages in the formal sector increased between 1979 and  1984, but wages for
well-specified classes  of  labor actually  decreased.  This  discrepancy  was due  to  the  change  in the
composition of the labor force, which was characterized by greater education, training and experience in
1984 than in 1979. A similar discrepancy could perhaps be found for the series depicted in Figures 2 and 3,
if these series could be disaggregated by classes of labor, which unfortunately is not possible.
5.  The Level of Minimum Wages
a)  Compared to minimum wages in other countries
Having established that wage misalignment was substantial in CFA countries over the late 1980s
and early 1990s, the issue is whether labor market policies and institutions played a role in explaining this
outcome.  Put differently, it is necessary to understand why private sector firms paid their workers so much
in excess of their alternative earnings.  The most obvious suspect in this respect is, of course, the minimum
wage policy characterizing CFA countries.  While the previous section found no evidence of indexation to
the SMIG, the latter could be still preventing wages from adjusting downwards.  This is because the SMIG
not only affects the earnings of those who make the bare legal minimum, but also the "floor" of the salary
grids  negotiated  between  trade  unions  and  employers,  hence  earnings  in  all  sectors  with  collective
bargaining.
From an international perspective, however, the minimum wages of CFA countries are not high
enough  to  account  for  the  observed  misalignment  of  their  average  wages.  Table  6  replicates the
international comparison carried out  in section 3, with the explained  variable being now  the ratio of
29minimum wages (rather than average wages) to output per capita.  The sample of countries is somewhat
smaller than in section 3, because there are fewer data on minimum wages in the data base being assembled
at  the Research Department of the World Bank.  Most of these data were originally collected  by US
embassies for the US Department of Labor, and refer mainly to the years 1985-88.7 The sample includes
now seven countries from the CFA zone.
As in the case of average wages, minimum wages tend to represent a higher multiple of per capita
output in poorer countries. More generally, the coefficients multiplying most of the variables considered in
Table 6 have the same sign as those estimated in Table 2 for average wages, but they tend to be statistically
insignificant.
The most  interesting feature of Table  6 is, of course, the positive  and statistically significant
coefficient associated with the dummy variable for CFA countries. As before, this coefficient does not vary
much with the set of explanatory variables included in the regression. Although the coefficients in columns
(C) and (D) seem to be 50 percentage points higher than those in columns (A) and (B), this  is due to the
inclusion of a  Sub-Saharan African dummy  in  the  specification.  The  coefficient on  this  variable  is
significantly negative, at around -50 percentage points.  Since CFA countries do also belong to the Sub-
Saharan African region, the net gap with other developing countries is still around 100 percentage points,
which is roughly the same as in columns (A) and (B).
A few countries (e.g. the UK) do not have a minimum wage policy.  The minimum wage is set
equal to zero  in their  case.  Strictly speaking, therefore, the  dependent variable  in Table  6 is
censored.  However, the number of countries with no minimum wage policy is small enough to
justify the use of ordinary least squares in the estimation.
30Table 6
Minimum  Wages  Across Countries
Dependent  variable:
Minimum  wage in 1985-93,  in percent of per capita  GDP
Explanatory  variables
(A)  (B)  (C)  (D)
CFA countries  109.9 **  106.2 **  153.6 **  146.9 **
(dummy  variable)  (4.950)  (4.493)  (5.037)  (4.802)
Per capita GDP in 1993,  -10.66 *  -4.337  -13.29 **  -6.370
in thousand  PPP dollars  (-2.304)  (-0.738)  (-2.821)  (-1.056)
Per capita GDP squared,  0.337  0.111  0.429  0.216
in million  PPP dollars  (1.471)  (0.434)  (1.865)  (0.840)
Urban  population,  -0.769  -0.717
in percent of the total  (-1.884)  (-1.742)
Mean years of schooling  0.250  -1.288
for ages 25 and above  (0.068)  (-0.344)
Countries  in Latin America  and  -7.443  0.461
the Caribbean  (durmmy  variable)  (-0.481)  (0.029)
Countries  in Sub-Saharan  -58.64 *  -54.30
Africa (dummy)  (-2.100)  (-1.937)
Independent  term|  109.1 **  128.3 **  126.3 **  143.3 **
(7.126)  (6.406)  (6.629)  (6.537)
Number of observations  71  71  71  71
Adjusted  R2 0.519  0.530  0.536  0.546
F test  26.15  16.80  17.16  13.07
Note:  Values  in parentheses  are "t" statistics. Significant  coefficients  at the 5 and 1 percent level are indicated  by one
and two asterisks  respectively.
31According  to the regressions  in Table 6, countries with the development  level of the CFA region are expected to have
minimum  wages  about twice as high as their per capita output. Observed  minimum  wages in these countries  are therefore
some 50 percent higher than predicted  by the regressions,  as illustrated  in Figure 4.  While such a discrepancy  is far from
being negligible,  it is clearly insufficient  to account for the observed  wage misalignment. Studies done for other countries
suggest  that the elasticity  of average wages to minimum  wages is relatively  low. For instance, in Indonesia  this elasticity
was estimated  at 0.1, in spite of substantial  government  efforts  to enforce minimum  wages (see Rama, 1996). The results
obtained  when evaluating  wage indexation  suggest  that  the elasticity  may in fact  be nil in CFA countries. But even if the 0.1
benchmark  was used, a 50 percent misalignment  of minimum  wages would translate into a 5 percent misalignment  of
average  wages,  a far cry from the 100  percent discrepancy  observed  in practice.
It can be argued that minimum  wages which are 50 percent higher than predicted  would not only raises average
wages, but also  depresses  economic  activity. Since  per capita output  is used as a deflator  to compare  wages  across  countries,
the impact  of minimum  wages  would be under-estimated. However,  the magnitude  of this bias is likely to be small. The
elasticity  of labor demand with respect to average wages is generally  estimated at less than one (in absolute  value). The
elasticity of output with respect to employment,  in turn, can be approximated  by the income share of labor, which by
definition  is also lower than one.  Therefore,  a 5 percent increase in average wages should lead to a decline of per capita
output  of less  than 5 percent  (in absolute  value). Which implies  that the misalignment  of minimumn  wages in CFA countries
can hardly  account  for more  than a 10  percent  misalignment  of their average  wages.
32Figure  4
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33b)  In  real  terms over  time
The comparison  of minimum  wages  across  countries  refers  to period 1985-93,  but most of the minimum  wage data
actually  correspond  to the years 1985-88. The issue  is whether a similar  analysis using  more recent data would'have  yielded
the same conclusions. After all, per capita output measured in real terms declined substantially  in most CFA countries
during the 1980s and early 1990s.  In C6te d'lvoire, it decreased at an annual rate of 4.6 percent, and in Niger it did it at an
annual rate of 4.1 percent. Although  in a less  dramatic  way, per capita output also decreased in Cameroon  (-2.2), Togo (-
2.1), Central African  Republic  (-1.6) and Gabon (-1.6 too).8 The current misalignment  of minimum  wages could therefore
be much higher  than suggested  by the results  in Table 6.
Minimum  wages  declined in real  terms during  this same period though,  as shown in Figures 5 and 6. Their annual
rate  of variation  per country, from the time when the terms-of-trade  levels  reached  their peak until before the devaluation  of
the CFA Franc, is indicated in parentheses  in the Figures, Although  the specific  dates chosen for the calculation  of these
rates (1977 and 1992 respectively)  are somewhat  arbitrary, the results would be similar if a few years were added or
subtracted  at both ends of the interval. What  these  rates show is that inflation  allowed  a substantial  decline  of real minimum
wages in all countries  where there are data, with the exception  of Niger.  In most cases, the minimum wage declined  at a
faster pace than per capita output.  So, by the time the devaluation of the CFA Franc took place the misalignment  of
minimum  wages  was probably  not larger  than indicated  by the international  comparison  in Table  6.
With the exception of Chad, which experienced a positive growth rate of 3.2 percent per year during this period, all
of the other countries in the region had annual growth rates of per capita output in the range of -1.0 to 1.0 percent.
34Figure  5
Minimum  Wages  in  Coastal  Countries
(at  constant  1980  prices)
CFA Francs  per  day
250 
200  - C8te  d'Ivoire  (-2.83%)
150  -




1961  1966  1971  1976  1981  1986  1991
Annual  growth  rates  over
1977-1992  in  parentheses
35Figure  6
Minimum  Wages  in  Sahel  Countries
(at  constant  1980  prices)
CFA Francs  per  day
160  -
140  -
120  Senegal  (-0.84%
100  |  Niger  (3.21%)
80 





0-*  l  7  l  l  ii  lI  l  l  l  l  l  l  li  l  li  ll
1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995
Annual  growth  rates  over
1977-1992  in  parentheses
36c)  As a function of macroeconomic conditions
The observed  decline  of  minimum  wages  in real  terms  suggests  that  policy  makers  in CFA  countries  were
responsive to the overall deterioration in macroeconomic conditions.  In general, governments can be expected to be more
prone to raise minimum wages  in "good" times,  and to freeze  them in "bad" times.  As long as there  is some  inflation,
freezing the minimum wage provides a mechanism to reduce the "floor" of formal sector wages.  This possible endogeneity
of  labor market  policies  in developing  countries  has  been  considered  and  analyzed  at  the  conceptual  level  in  several
opportunities (see Freeman,  1993, and Rama  and Tabellini,  1997, among others).  Countries in the CFA region provide an
opportunity to test it at the empirical level.
The simplest way to implement an empirical test of the  endogeneity of  minimum wages  is to treat their  yearly
change as a censored variable, partially reflecting the yearly change of a latent variable.  The implicit assumption is that the
optimal change  in the minimum  wage, from  the viewpoint  of policy makers,  is some  stable function  of  macroeconomic
variables such as the changes in aggregate prices, in the level of economic activity and in the termns  of trade.  These variables
evolve over time, and so does the optimal change in the minimum wage.  However, social and political constraints imply the
minimum wage cannot be cut in nominal terms.  Given these constraints, the  actual minimum wage would increase only
when its optimal change is positive.  When it is negative, in turn, the actual minimum wage would remain frozen in nominal
terms, as was the case in CFA countries in most of the years preceding the 1994 devaluation.
This simple model  is applied to the annual changes of the  SMIG in all of the CFA countries for which  data are
available.  In practice, this  amounts to using a sample with slightly  less than 200 observations, most of which are zeroes.
The latent variable (i.e. the optimal change in the nominal SMIG, from the policy-makers perspective)  is assumed to be a
function  of  annual  changes  in  consumer  prices,  in  economic  activity  and  the  in  terms-of-trade  level.  All  three
macroeconomic variables are measured at the country level and included in the regression with a lag of at least one year, to
37Table 7
Minimum  Wage  Endogeneity
Dependent  variable:  annual  Dependent  variable:  annual
change in the log of  change  in minimum  wage (1
the minimum  wage  if raised,  0 otherwise)
Explanatory  variables
Tobit estimates  Logit  estimates
(A)  (B)  (C)  (D)
Change  in the log of terms  of  0.3193**  0.3177**  2.7294**  2.7325**
trade (lagged  two years)  (2.042)  (2.036)  (2.162)  (2.116)
Change in the log of output at  1.0943 **  1.0774 **  7.3127 **  7.1094 **
constant  prices (lagged  one year)  (2.480)  (2.420)  (2.211)  (2.116)
Change in the log of consumer  1.1033 **  1.0924 **  9.0364 **  9.0920 **
prices  (lagged  one year)  (3.312)  (3.228)  (3.520)  (3.440)
Country-specific  No  Yes  No  Yes
dummy  variables
Independent term  -0.2508 **  -1.8457 **
(-5.064)  (-6.587)
Number  of observations  187  187  187  187
Pseudo  R 2 0.185  0.207  0.116  0.134
Chi-square  test  24.49  27.47  24.91  28.76
Note:  All variables  are defined  at the country level.  Values in parentheses  are "t" statistics. Significant  coefficients  at the 5 and 1
percent level  are indicated  by one and two asterisks  respectively.
38avoid simultaneity  problems. The hypothesis  to be tested is that these macroeconomic  variables have a positive impact on
the latent variable,  hence  indirectly  on the level of the SMIG.
The results obtained when estimating  this model, reported in Table 7, indicate  that minimum  wages were highly
responsive  to changes in macroeconomic  conditions. Table 7 includes several columns with different specifications,  to
address  the problems  raised by the estimation  of a censored-variable  model with panel data.9 The results which  are easiest
to interpret  are those in columns  (A) and (B).
Because  of the way units were chosen,  the regression  coefficients  in these columns  are in fact elasticities. The units used for
the dependent  variable in columns (C) and (D) allow to verify the sign and significance  of the results obtained in the other
two columns,  but they yield coefficient  values with no straightforward  interpretation.
While  the levels  of minimum  wages  in CFA countries  could be criticized  as being too high, the way these levels  are
adjusted to changes in macroeconomic conditions is more difficult to object.  The estimated elasticity of the optimal
miniimum  wage with respect to both aggregate  prices and real output is almost one.  The unit elasticities imply  that the real
minimum  wage fully incorporates  the effects of real shocks,  but is not affected by nominal  shocks. Moreover,  the elasticity
of the optimal  minimum  wage with respect  to the terms-of-trade  level is about 0.3, which roughly  corresponds  to the average
The main problem is how to deal with country-specific  disturbances. In a linear  regression,  the standard  solution  is
to use  the fixed effects approach,  which entails replacing  the explained  variable by its deviation  with respect to the
country mean. But in a censored-variable  regression  the latent variable is not always observable,  implying  that the
country mean cannot be calculated.  One possible solution is to  assume that disturbances follow the  same
distribution  in all countries. This is the assumption  underlying  the specification in column (A).  While it may be
objected  in the general case, it is plausible  here, due to the influence  of France on the economic  policies of all CFA
countries. In practice, this assumption holds true if there is a common policy rule across the CFA zone, with
changes in the SMIG  at the country level reflecting  random  deviations  from that rule. A different  way to implement
the fixed effects approach is to include a dummy for each of the countries among the explanatory variables.
Computing  capabilities  rule out this solution  when the number  of individuals  in the panel is large,  while the number
of periods is small. But the panel considered  here involves  only  a few countries,  so that this is a feasible  altemative.
The results are reported in column (B).  Although  the implicit assumption in this case is that the policy rule may
differ across countries,  the similarity  between  the results in columns  (A) and (B) is striking. In both columns,  the
Tobit estimation  method is used. Columns  (C) and (D), in turn, apply a methology  first introduced  by Chamberlain
(1980). The explained  variable is now set equal  to zero when the minimum  wage does not change,  and equal  to one
when it is raised. This  transformation  of the explained  variable  allows using  the fixed effects approach in non-linear
models,  such as the censored-variable  model. The coefficients  in equations  (C) and (D) are Logit estimates.
39openness  coefficient  of CFA countries. Therefore,  the way minimum  wages  react to real shocks takes into account not only
the domestic  fluctuations  in total productivity,  but also the fluctuations  stemming  from external shocks.
The results in Table 7 also indicate that in the absence of any change in the macroeconomic  conditions,  the real
value of the optimal minimum  wage would decrease  over time. If both the terms-of-trade  level and the level of real output
remained  constant,  the minimum  wage would  not be adjusted  even in the presence  of a significant  price increase. Taken  at
face value,  the independent  term in column (A) implies that the minimum  wage would be raised only if the annual inflation
rate  exceeded  25 percent. Obviously,  this figure should not be interpreted  literally. It suggests,  however,  that policy makers
in CFA countries not only reacted in a sensible manner to real shocks, but also took advantage of inflation to gradually
correct  the initial  misalignment  of their minimum  wages.
In spite of being endogenous,  minimum  wages  could still entail potentially  relevant distortions  to the allocation of
resources. Based on the obtained  results,  it is nonetheless  difficult to claim that these distortions  were bigger  at the time of
the devaluation  than in the relatively  prosperous 1970s.  Even in the absence of the adverse shocks experienced by CFA
countries since then, minimum  wages would have declined in real termis. Moreover, if the fluctuations  of average wages
followed  those of minimum  wages, the magnitude  of the distortions  stemming  from the latter should have remained roughly
unchanged  subsequent  to these shocks. Which suggests  that the real causes  of wage misalignment  lie elsewhere..
6.  Other Potential Explanations
a)  Trade unions
Trade unions are another obvious candidate to explain wage misalignment.  Although the labor movement is
numerically  weak in CFA countries, it is well implanted in the formal sector of the economy.  Moreover, it has been
traditionally  well connected  to the political party in power, which in principle  should give it more leverage. Unfortunately,
there are only a few studies  analyzing  in detail what trade unions actually  do in CFA countries,  and they generally adopt a
40sociological  perspective  (see, for instance,  Ndiaye and Tidjani, 1995). The available  economic  studies, in turn, are based on
quite small samples.  The interesting thing, however, is they all find that union members earn less than similar, non-
unionized  wage earners.
The available  estimates of the union wage premium  in CFA countries are reported in Table 8.  The figures in this
table indicate  the percent change in earnings an individual  with "average" characteristics  would experience  by shifting  from
a non-unionized  to a unionized  activity. These figures are based on Mincerian  equations which include a dummy variable
for unionization among their explanatory variables.  The fact that union wage premia are negative suggests that union
members may get other, non-wage benefits that compensate for the lower earnings.  But this is also the case in other
countries,  while the negative  premium is highly atypical from an international  perspective. In developing  countries, union
members  usually  make 5 to 30 percent more  than their non-unionized  counterparts.
41Table 7
Minimum  Wage  Endogeneity
Dependent  variable:  annual  Dependent  variable:  annual
change in the log of  change in minimum  wage (1
the minimum  wage  if raised, 0 otherwise)
Explanatory variables
Tobit estimates  Logit estimates
(A)  (B)  (C)  (D)
Change in the log of terms of  0.3193**  0.3177**  2.7294**  2.7325**
trade (lagged  two years)  (2.042)  (2.036)  (2.162)  (2.116)
Change in the log of output at  1.0943 **  10774 **  7.3127  **  7.1094  **
constant  prices (lagged one year)  (2.480)  (2.420)  (2.211)  (2.116)
Change in the log of consumer  1.1033 **  1.0924 **  9.0364 **  9.0920 **
prices (lagged one year)  (3.312)  (3.228)  (3.520)  (3.440)
Country-specific  No  Yes  No  Yes
dummy  variables
Independent  term  -0.2508  **  -1.8457  **
(-5.064)  (-6.587)
Number of observations  187  187  187  187
Pseudo  R2 0.185  0.207  0.116  0.134
Chi-square test  24.49  27.47  24.91  28.76
Note:  All variables are defined at the country level.  Values in parentheses are "t" statistics. Significant  coefficients  at
the 5 and 1 percent level are indicated  by one and two asterisks  respectively.
Low or even negative  union wage premia  would be consistent  with the "subordinate"  nature  of the labor movement
in many CFA countries (see Nelson,  1991).  Trade unions may have been instrumental in implementing the wage
moderation  policies set up by governments  in this region in recent years. Although  this pattern may change as competition
42between unions develops in the workplace, it would be difficult to make them responsible for the wage misalignment
observed  in the late 1980s  and early 1990s.
b)  Government  pay policies
Fluctuations  in formal sector wages  were shown  to follow  closely those in average government  wages. This link is
hardly surprising,  given that public sector employment represents about one half of formal sector employment in CFA
countries,  if not more.  Government  pay policies therefore emerge as a potential  explanation  for wage misalignment. The
issue is whether government wages are high enough for this explanation to be relevant in practice.  This issue can be
addressed applying  the same methodology  that was used to measure  the earnings gap between  formal and informal  sector
jobs, or between  union and non-union  jobs. But it is important  to keep in mind that some of the advantages  of working for
the government are not reflected in higher wage earnings.  These advantages include more job security, better fringe
benefits, lower effort levels, the possibility  of moon-lighting  (i.e. having two jobs) or even of taking bribes. A similarity
between  the cash earnings of public and private  sector employees  would thus imply that the former are better off than the
latter.
43Table 9
Wage Prernium for Public Sector Jobs
Estimation  Burkina  Cote
Study  technique  Faso  Cameroon  d'Ivoire  Mali  Senegal
Berthelemy and  OLS
Bourguignon  with dummy  - 14.3 %
variable
(1992; Table  for govern-  [CILSS, 1985;
4.4, page 98)  ment jobs  N  =  311]
OLS
Lachaud  plus Probit  20.5 %  38.4 %  12.6 %  34.8 %  19.0 %
for self-
(1993a; Table  selection  [IIES, 1990-91;  [VIES,  1990-  [VIES,  1986-  [lIES, 1991;  [IIES, 1991; N
6, page 20)  of jobs  N  =234]  91; N =293]  87; N  = 277]  N =379]  =243]
OLS
Lachaud  with dLu  mmy  - 28.0 %
variable
(1993c; Table  for public  [Census, 1988;
B, pages 45-46)  sector jobs  N  =  181,7571
(Continued)
44Table 9 (Contd.)
Wage Premium  for Public  Sector  Jobs
Estimation  Burkina  Cote
Study  technique  Faso  Cameroon  d'Ivoire  Mali  Senegal
Levy  and  OLS
Newman  with dummy  - 17.3 %
variable
(1989;  Table  for public  [ONFP, 1984;
6, page 106)  sector jobs  N =  10,835]
Miller  and  OLS
Vallee  with dummy  11.1 %
variable
(1995;  Table  for 100%  [RPED,  1994;
6.5, page 163)  private firms  N =  517]
Van der Gaag  FIML
et al.  with  -26.5  %
switching
(1989; Table  regression  [CILSS,  1985;
5, page 28)  model  N = 513]
Note:  Depending on the studies, the public sector may or may not include state-owned  enterprises.  All  studies control for  individual
characteristics,  but the set of controls  varies  across studies. The wage premium  is based on the coefficient  (c) multiplying  the public sector
dummy  variable, except in the case of Berth6lemy  and Bourguignon  (1992), where it is based on the difference  between  coefficients  for
government  and other formal  sector  jobs.  For large values  of the c coefficients,  in absolute  terms, the percent premia is approximated  as
100[exp(c)-1].  Data sources  and sample sizes are reported  in brackets. CILSS  is the Cote d'Ivoire Living Standards  Survey,  a household
survey with national  coverage. IIES is a series of labor force surveys  carried out by the Institut International  d'Etudes Sociales  in the
capital cities.  ONFP is a plant-level  survey covering large firms, but reporting data on individual  workers.  RPED is the Regional
Program  for Enterprise  Development,  a plant-level  survey  which includes  data on up to 10 workers  in each firm.
45owned commercial enterprises.  Although the number of studies is quite limited, some of them
involve thousands of observations, which increases their reliability.  With the exception of C6te
d'Ivoire, where the wage premium is negative, public sector employees thus appear to make around
10 to 30 percent more than their private sector fellows. 10
Taking non-wage benefits into account, these studies imply that working for the public
sector entails significant rents.  Moreover, the comparison in Table 9 is mainly based on wages.  It
therefore involves formal sector jobs, be these public or private.  It was shown above that wages in
the private, formal sector of the economy were much higher than other labor earnings.  The results
reported in Table 9 imply that public sector wages are even higher.  This conclusion, together with
the finding that wages in the private formal sector follow closely the fluctuation of public sector
wages,  suggests that  government  pay  policies  are  one  of  the  main  driving  forces  of  wage
misalignment in CFA countries.
c)  Product market distortions
Another  potential culprit  for  wage misalignment are  the  rents created  by  barriers to
competition in product market.  If they had some monopoly power, firms could behave as price
makers rather than price takers.  The prices they would charge for their products would usually
involve some mark-up over their unit costs, including labor costs, with the mark-up ratio being
larger the higher their monopoly power. Therefore, a stable relationship between wages and prices,
10  The Ivorian result was surprising enough to prompt van der Gaag et al. (1989) to use data
on  moon-lighting to check that the estimated earnings differentials made  sense.  They
found that moon-lighting was more prevalent among public sector workers than  among
those in the private sector.  They also found that the wage disadvantage of public sector
employees was an important determinant of moon-lighting.  This latter result can be seen
as an additional confirmation that the wage premium is negative in C6te d'Ivoire.
46like one the identified  in Tables  4 and 5, would exist. Moreover,  as long as replacing  incumbent
workers is costly, insiders  could capture some of the rents created  by barriers  to competition  in
product markets.  As a  result, a  stable relationship  between wages and alternative  earnings
(including  government  wages)  would  emerge.
Countries  in the  CFA region  are said to be characterized  by significant  monopoly  power  in
product  markets. A few firms operate in each industry,  quite often under the umbrella  of some
convention speciale with the government, involving tax exemptions and  other preferential
treatments. It would not be surprising  if workers  in these firms managed  to secure  a share of the
resulting  rents, under  the form of wages  well above  other  labor  earnings  in the economy. Note that
rent sharing  would  be feasible  even if trade unions  did not push  for high wages. Substantial  firing
costs, like  those characterizing  CFA countries  during  most of the period  under  consideration,  would
be enough  for barriers  to competition  in product  markets  to lead to both high domestic  prices  and
high formal  sector  wages.
Unfortunately,  there is no empirical  evidence  to support  (nor to reject)  the hypothesis  that
limited competition  in product markets is one of the reasons for wage misalignment  in CFA
countries.  The standard  way to check this hypothesis  is to estimate Mincerian  equations  that
include  indicators  of profitability  at the firm or the sectoral level among  the control  variables. A
positive  coefficient  multiplying  these  profitability  indicators  can be interpreted  as evidence  of rent
sharing by workers.  The only such estimate available for CFA countries uses the effective
protection  rate as one of the arguments  in the Mincerian  equation  (Terrell  and Svejnar,  1989). The
coefficient  multiplying  this variable  turns out to be statistically  insignificant,  but the sample is
small and the effective  protection  rate is not the most appropriate  measure  for rents.  This single
estimate  being inconclusive,  the claimed  link between  wage misalignment  and limited  competition
in product  markets  remains  plausible,  but it is by no means  certain.
47'7.  Conclusion
This paper has shown that wage misalignment was substantial in CFA countries over the
1980s and early  1990s.  Formal  sector wages were much higher than  in other countries with a
similar development level, and also much higher than labor earnings in the informal sector of the
economy.  However, the paper has also shown that wage nmisalignment  cannot be traced down to
the labor market policies and  institutions in force in any obvious  manner.  Particularly, it has
produced evidence that minimum wages did not play a major role in obstructing the adjustment
to the adverse external shocks of the late  1970s.  From a cross-country perspective,  minimum
wages were  not high enough to  explain a  significant  share of the  observed  misalignment  of
wages.  From a  time-series perspective,  they  decreased in real terms  and were  adjusted  in a
sensible manner to changes in the macroeconomic context.  Trade unions do not appear to be at
the roots of wage misalignment either.
None of these findings implies that the labor market of CFA countries is flexible.  The
results in the paper actually suggest that formal sector wages are rigid.  But they  appear to be
rigid in real terms, rather than in monetary terms.  Their level fluctuates in line with that of other
key  prices  in  the  economy,  such  as average  government  wages  or  consumer  prices.  One
explanation for this finding is related to government pay policies.  Given how large the public
sector  is compared to the  private formal  sector,  and  given also  how  high  its salaries  are  in
relative terms, government pay policies may strongly influence labor market outcomes in CFA
countries.  Another plausible, but more hypothetical explanation is the existence of barriers to
competition in product markets.  Monopoly power in product markets, combined with high costs
48of replacing incumbent  workers, could indeed account for high domestic prices, high formal
sector  wages, and a stable relationship  between  the two.
If wages are rigid in real terms, rather than in nominal terms, devaluing  the CFA Franc
can boost competitiveness  and reduce wage misalignment only for a  limited time.  Real
distortions,  like those entailed by barriers  to competition  in product  markets, cannot  be fixed by
changing  the level of nominal  instruments. Of course,  real wages  may drift back to their original
levels at a slow pace, especially because CFA countries were sheltered from exchange rate
fluctuations  for decades. But devaluations  are increasingly  ineffective  as private sector agents
become used to them.  If real reforms are not undertaken,  there is a risk that moving in the
direction  of a more flexible  exchange  rate may only result in ever higher  inflation  rates.
More generally, the results in this paper cast doubts on the conventional wisdom
regarding  adjustment in CFA countries. It seems widely accepted that the main obstacle to a
deflationary  adjustment  was the downward  rigidity of formal sector  wages. But the analysis  for
Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal  shows that both wages in the formal sector and labor earnings in the
informal sector increased substantially  during the 1980s and early 1990s. If anything, labor
earnings  in the informal  sector increased  at an even faster pace than wages in the formal sector.
Which suggests  that the alleged  deflationary  pressure  failed to materialize. Although  a detailed
analysis  of the reasons  why this may have happened  is clearly  beyond the reach of this paper, a
quick discussion  is warranted  to put any recommendations  for labor  market reform in the proper
context.
Two complementary  explanations  can be given for the failure of deflationary  pressures
to materialize. The first one involves  the budget institutions  of CFA countries. Adverse external
shocks  may  have led to an increase  in the budget  deficit  due to a tax structure  relying  excessively
on foreign trade (Nashishibi and Bazzoni, 1994).  Marketing board mechanisms, aimed in
49principle at stabilizing the domestic price of exports, may have played an important role in this
respect.  Since the "stabilization" tends to happen at low domestic prices, a one-dollar decrease
in commodity exports translates automatically into a one-dollar decrease in government revenue.
The same  happens  with  oil exports.  As  long as  government  expenditures  remain  constant,
changes in the budget deficit thus offset any terms-of-trade effect.
The monetary counterpart to this excess spending by the government can be found in the
institutions  underlying the  CFA Franc.  In  the  1970s, part  of the  central  banking  authority
regarding the CFA Franc was transferred from France to  the region.  Some relaxation  of the
monetary  discipline  ensued,  as  reflected  by  the  increase  of  the  ceiling  on  outstanding
government debt, from  10 to  20 percent of tax  revenue in the previous year.  Devarajan and
Walton (1994) claim that this and other arrangements allowed significant fiscal laxity.  Because
all member countries share the same currency, the fiscal excesses of one country potentially spill
over to the union as a whole.  As shown by Aizenman (1992), the lack of coordination between
decision makers, each of whom can effectively  increase the money supply, can be expected to
create an inflationary bias.
Although this  is an over-simplified  interpretation of events, it sheds a new light on the
relationship  between  wage  misalignment  on  the  one  hand,  and  labor  market  policies  and
institutions on the other hand.  In this interpretation, both wages and prices in the formal sector
of CFA countries were high to begin with because of government pay policies and, possibly, also
because of significant barriers to competition  in product markets.  They  became increasingly
misaligned over time due to  significant budget deficits, fueled  by the combined effect  of ill-
designed budgetary and monetary institutions.  If the interpretation is to be accepted, its policy
implications  are  straightforward.  A  monetary  mechanism  imposing  more  discipline  on
government expenditures, a tax system relying less on exports and more competition  in product
50markets  would be  needed to reduce  the risk of  over-valuation when  facing  adverse external
shocks.
As regards labor market reform, it would certainly be key to improve microeconomic
efficiency.  Relaxing firing and hiring regulations, as several CFA countries already did, would
facilitate labor reallocation across sectors and help firms survive when confronted with adverse
shocks.  Allowing a more decentralized wage bargaining, and not forcing firms and workers who
are  not  represented  in the  negotiation  to  be  subject to  it,  would  also  be welcome.  More
generally, reforms of the labor market policies and institutions of CFA countries in line with the
recommendations of the World Bank (1995a and 1995b) should be beneficial.  But it would be
naive  to  see  these  reforms  as a  safeguard  against wage  misalignment  if  the  budgetary  and
monetary institutions of CFA countries remain unchanged.
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